The 
Introduction
The Kadi case 1 is perhaps the most visible and interesting case of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) for external relations in recent years. The Court essentially had to decide whether a United Nations Security Council resolution should enjoy primacy over EU law. We all know that the Court did not allow for this primacy.
This judgment and the Court's reasoning have provoked severe criticism. The Court's dualist approach was described as unfaithful to its traditional fidelity to public international law 2 and inserting itself in the tradition of nationalism. 3 However, we would underline the opening that the Court indicated which would allow for precedence of Security Council measures, if sufficient safeguards for human rights were created. Most interestingly, it seems that the Security Council has recently risen to the challenge by introducing a strong review mechanism. Though this mechanism cannot exclude all possible conflicts between EU and UN law it can significantly reduce the risk of divergent decisions. After a short overview of the General Court's (GC's) reasoning in the first instance judgment and of the judgment on appeal, we will show how far the Court's approach should be characterized as dualist, or rather as a variation of the so-called 'Solange' concept. This concept was developed by the German Constitutional Court and also applied by the European Court of Human Rights. Against this background, we will address the review mechanism introduced by the Security Council after Kadi.
The Kadi Judgment
The basic facts of the Kadi case are as follows: In the UN Security Council Kadi was identified as a possible supporter of Al-Qaida. Therefore, he was singled out for sanctions, in particular for an assets freeze. The EU transposed this UN sanction by a regulation which Kadi then attacked before the EU Courts. At first instance, the GC refused to review the EU regulation because this would amount to a review of the measure of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the GC examined whether the Security Council had respected ius cogens, in particular certain fundamental rights. But the General Court did not find an infringement of this standard.
In its judgment on appeal, the CJEU pursued a different path. It reviewed the lawfulness of the EU regulation transposing the resolution. 4 Its central argument was that the protection of fundamental rights forms part of the very foundations of the Union legal order.
5 Accordingly, all Union measures must be compatible with fundamental rights. 6 The Court reasoned that this does not amount to a review of the lawfulness of the Security Council measures. The review of lawfulness would apply only to the Union act that gives effect to the international agreement at issue and not to the latter as such.
to be heard as well as his right to effective judicial review 8 and the right to property 9 had been infringed.
Dualist but Ready to Compromise?
In contrast to the judgment of the GC, 10 the judgment of the CJEU in Kadi has been associated with a dualist conception of the interplay between the international and the Union legal order. It is seen as underscoring and defending the autonomy of EU law.
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On this point, the Court followed Advocate General Poiares Maduro's Opinion 12 holding that 'obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty'. 13 However, deriving from this a general hostility towards public international law would be unjust. It would disregard the complex argument the Court developed and ignore the nuanced signals it sent.
In particular, it should be recalled that at the outset it was not clear whether the EU, not being a member of the UN, was bound at all by UN SC measures. Although the EU did not assume the powers of its Member States in the UN system, as it did with regard to the GATT, 14 the Court nevertheless considered that the EU must respect the undertakings given in the context of the UN and take due account of the resolution. The choice of a somewhat dualist approach in this particular context has to be understood as a reaction to a specific situation that may occur in multilevel systems. In such systems it is possible that the level of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by a higher level does not attain the level of protection the lower level has developed and considers indispensable. Refusing to accept the primacy of the higher level can be a proper means of responding to this deficiency. The insufficient protection of fundamental rights at UN level 16 therefore required the adoption of a dualist conception of the interplay of EU law and international law.
17
The Court found itself in a comparable situation in the 1970s, its counterpart at that time being the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. The latter considered the level of fundamental rights protection available at EU level to be lower than at national level. This was only natural in view of the historical stage of development of the European Economic Community and of the CJEU at the time. The Bundesverfassungsgericht therefore decided to reserve to itself the right to review Union action for its conformity with national fundamental rights as long as there was insufficient protection at EU level.
18 This is the so-called Solange I decision, derived from the German for 'as long as'. Twelve years later, taking account of the positive development of EU fundamental rights protection, the Bundesverfassungsgericht declared that it no longer needed to perform this review, as long as the EU kept to its elevated standard of protection. This is referred to as its Solange II decision.
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The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) followed comparable reasoning in its Bosphorus decision where it chose to abstain from exercising control with regard to EU acts. 20 Quite remarkably, it chose to pursue a different path when it declared itself incompetent to review UN SC measures. There that Court decided to deny its competence without keeping the safety net of a 'Solange caveat'. 21 Some commentators criticized this decision severely. 22 In his opinion on Kadi Advocate General Maduro had pointed out the possibility of adopting a Solange-type solution. 23 The Court was more prudent but has left the door open for such an approach. 24 It examined fairly extensively the argument presented by the Commission that the Court must not intervene since Mr Kadi had had, through the re-examination procedure before the Sanctions Committee, an acceptable opportunity to be heard within the UN legal system. The Court responded that such an immunity from EU jurisdiction 'appears unjustified, for clearly that re-examination procedure does not offer the guarantees of judicial protection'. 25 By referring solely to the procedure in question in the proceedings, the Court implied that the position could be different with regard to procedures that do offer the guarantees of judicial protection. 26 This proves that the Court did not follow a strictly dualist approach in its judgment. In that case there would have been no reason to discuss the argument as to an alleged Solange II situation in substance. Pointing to the autonomy of the Union legal order and the competence of the CJEU within that legal order to review the validity of EU acts would have sufficed to exclude, as a matter of principle, the mere possibility of a Solange II approach.
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The Court's decision not, at least for the time being, to accord precedence to SC measures is understandable, if not indispensable in regard to another Solange relationship; that between EU Member States' legal orders and the Union legal order. Should the EU convey the impression of sacrificing basic constitutional guarantees by accepting the general primacy of Security Council measures, Member States, in particular their constitutional courts, would probably feel tempted to take safeguarding these guarantees into their own hands. From an international perspective this would be even worse: It would not only question the primacy of public international law within the EU legal order but also call into question the primacy of EU law over national law.
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This would undermine the whole concept of integration through law. Also from this perspective Kadi could hardly have been decided differently.
Subsequent Developments at the Security Council -is it Time for Solange II?
To envisage a Solange II relationship between the EU and the SC, the judicial protection at the UN level has to improve substantially in comparison to the situation examined 24 This mechanism was applied in the second Kadi case. Before the Commission again froze the assets of Mr Kadi he was given the opportunity to comment on the narrative summary provided by the SC. 30 However, the General Court was not satisfied. Regarding the rights of defence, the GC took the view that they 'have been "observed" only in the most formal and superficial sense', 31 since the Commission did not foresee any possibility of departing from the Sanctions Committee's findings in light of Mr Kadi's observations. Moreover, he did not have access to the evidence against him concerning his alleged relationship to Al-Qaida. 32 Given that he could access only a summary of reasons, he was not in a position effectively to challenge any of the allegations against him. 33 This breach of the rights of defence also affected Mr Kadi's rights to effective judicial review 34 and property. 35 The appeal against this judgment is currently pending. 36 Meanwhile, in 2009, the SC created the office of an independent Ombudsperson. In 2010 Kimberly Prost, a former judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, was appointed to this position. Her task is to process the requests of individuals or entities to be deleted from the list. The Ombudsperson does not decide on her own; rather she collects data, communicates with petitioners, and drafts reports to the Sanctions Committee. If the request is refused, the Ombudsperson informs the petitioner of the reasons for refusal, provided that they are not confidential. 37 Initially, only the Sanctions Committee was competent to decide on a possible removal from the list. During this stage, the Committee had to decide unanimously to delist a petitioner. Consequently, any individual state could prevent a removal from the list in spite of the position of the Ombudsperson.
It should be noted that the GC, in an obiter dictum to the second Kadi case, did not consider these improvements sufficient. 31 Kadi v. Commission, supra note 30, at para. 171. 32 Ibid., at para. 173. 33 Ibid., at para. 177. 34 Ibid., at para. 181. 35 Ibid., at paras 192 ff. However, in June 2011 the Security Council strengthened the Ombudsperson's powers significantly. 39 Since then, a recommendation to delist in principle becomes effect ive if it is not rejected by consensus in the Sanctions Committee within 60 days. In the absence of consensus, this outcome can be avoided only if a Committee member requests referral to the SC. This means that delisting will require the votes of nine out of the 15 members of the SC and can be blocked by the veto of any of the five permanent members. 40 As the SC usually publishes its deliberations, opposition to a recommendation of the Ombudsperson could engage the political responsibility of the state in question. It might even open the way to judicial remedies before the courts of that state.
This amended procedure responds to some extent to a number of concerns voiced by the Court, especially regarding the grounds for listing. Though a listing may still in part be based on confidential information, why a person is or stays listed no longer remains completely secret. 41 Additionally, petitioners now can themselves or through their chosen representatives assert their rights before the Ombudsperson. 42 Moreover, the Ombudsperson seeks to guarantee fair proceedings and transparent standards to analyse information on the individuals concerned consistently and ob jectively. 43 The yardstick for the examination is 'whether there is sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for the listing'. 44 Her track record for the first 27 cases is impressive: Until 31 May 2012, in 13 cases the applicants were delisted, in one case the delisting was denied, in another case the request for delisting was withdrawn. 12 more cases are currently under investigation or already with the Committee. 45 It is not inconceivable that the independent recommendations of the Ombudsperson may amount to a quasi-judicial role that could provide a counter-balance to the diplomatic nature of the proceedings within the Sanctions Committee. 46 Already her re commendations have politically and practically acquired some binding effect on the Sanctions Committee, making derogation difficult.
However, her role has not attained the quality of a court of law, 47 in particular because the Committee or the SC can reserve the final decision for itself. In the latter case any of the permanent members can prevent a delisting without having to provide reasons.
Moreover, as her recommendations to the Sanctions Committee are not accessible, it cannot be assessed whether the Ombudsperson applies clear legal standards, equivalent to the fundamental rights guaranteed within the EU. Therefore, it is unclear whether the CJEU would consider this review sufficient to refrain from controlling implementing acts of the EU.
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Exhaustion of 'Local' Remedies
Nevertheless, this procedure could be employed to reduce significantly the risk of conflict between UN sanctions and EU judicial protection. This could be achieved if the action in the EU Courts was necessarily preceded by an unsuccessful petition to the Ombudsperson. 49 A petition would enable the UN Ombudsperson, being closer to the case, to work towards a resolution of the problem at the source. 50 Cases without sufficient grounds for a listing should be resolved by her review. And they should be resolved much faster than in the EU Courts: The completed reviews took between six and 13 months. Mr Kadi, on the other hand, has already spent 10 years before the EU Courts.
Even if such a review does not result in a delisting it generates information on the reasons for the listing. The Ombudsperson will collect all the available information and allow the petitioner to comment, at least on the non-confidential parts. She and the Committee will evaluate this information and provide the petitioner with a reasoned decision. In the context of subsequent judicial proceedings the EU Courts could require the applicant to produce the communication he had with the Ombudsperson, in particular any reasons provided for maintaining the listing. They could use this information to examine the case. If the decision to maintain the listing at UN level is taken rationally, it should be possible to confirm it most of the time in the EU Courts.
Problems are likely to arise if the listing cannot be justified exclusively on the basis of non-classified information but also depends on confidential information. In this regard, the ECtHR considers that the requirements of a fair trial are not satisfied if detention is based solely or to a decisive degree on secret material. 51 It remains to be seen whether the EU Courts will develop a similar standard by which to assess targeted sanctions. The question remains how a requirement for a preliminary review by the Ombudsperson can be introduced into the judicial procedure of the EU Courts. At first view a requirement to exhaust remedies provided by another legal system, in this case the UN, is counterintuitive under EU law. The right to bring an action before the EU Courts is provided for in the Treaty and it is also an expression of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Therefore, it is doubtful whether even the legislator could require applicants to exhaust the UN review procedure before addressing the EU Courts.
Nevertheless, some inspiration may be found in the case law of the GC on similar sanctions that the EU imposes because competent Member State authorities have identified the persons or associations in question. In these cases it must be assessed whether the EU decision to introduce or maintain a sanction is justified. In this regard, the GC restricts the scope of substantial judicial review until Member States' remedies are exhausted. Because the sanctions are based on Member States' decisions the EU institutions should afford precedence to matters of internal procedure when assessing the need to maintain a sanction. 53 This case law is based on the principle of loyal cooperation between EU institutions and Member States. 54 UN sanctions could be treated similarly. It could be considered that the EU acts appropriately, if it waits for the result of a review by the Ombudsperson before re-examining whether sanctions should be maintained. Although the EU principle of loyal cooperation as such does not apply to relations with the SC, the Court has already recognized similar obligations in the first Kadi case. There, it found that the EU must respect the undertakings given in the context of the UN and take due account of the resolution. 55 This finding is based on the Treaties: According to Articles 3(5) and 21(1) TEU the EU respects the principles of the UN Charter. Additionally, Article 220 TFEU requires that the Union establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the UN.
Moreover, this solution would be another expression of the well established local remedies rule in international human rights law and the law of diplomatic protection. This rule has already inspired the Court in another context, namely with regard to accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In a discussion paper, the CJEU stressed that the ECtHR should not decide on the conformity of an act of the Union with the Convention without the CJEU first having had an opportunity to give a definitive ruling on the point. 56 Accordingly, the draft accession agreement includes provisions that would allow such a ruling. 57 
